Abstract. Studies of optimal second-best environmental regulation of identical polluting agents have invariably ignored potentially welfare-improving asymmetric regulation by imposing equal regulatory treatment of identical firms at the outset. Yet, cost asymmetry between oligopoly firms may well give rise to private as well as social gains. A trade-off is demonstrated for the regulator, between private costs savings and additional social costs when asymmetric treatment is allowed. Asymmetry is indeed optimal for a range of plausible parameter values. Further, it is demonstrated that for a broad class of abatement cost functions, there is scope for increasing welfare while keeping both total output and total emission constant. Some motivating policy issues are discussed in light of the results, including international harmonization and global carbon dioxide reduction.
Introduction
In the literature on environmental regulation, it has invariably been taken for granted in much theoretical as well as applied work that any optimal environmental regulation of identical polluting firms would involve setting the same requirements for all firms. Whether identical treatment of symmetric agents is always well-founded from a normative standpoint has hardly ever been questioned. When discrimination appears in practice, economists have typically resorted to arguments of political economy and interest group influence or strategic behaviour of decision-makers to explain observed outcomes.
1 In the international arena, most policy economists also approve of identical requirements across polluting units to secure Pareto improvements. For instance, this is reflected within the European Union where harmonisation of environmental standards and taxes is given high priority on the political agenda to reduce distortions of trade. In the context of instrument design at the national level, the US method of grandfathered emission permits treats firms equally if and only if these firms are considered identical (in terms of historical emission, production level, etc.)
Recent economic theory has however seriously challenged the conventional wisdom of unconditional symmetric treatment. Salant and Shaffer (1999) and Long and Soubeyran (2001) provide general analyses of two-stage games where producers compete a la Cournot in the second stage, upon firstperiod actions that determine their marginal costs, taken either by the firms or their government. In such settings, rearranging marginal costs between ex ante identical firms while keeping the sum of marginal costs unaltered may result in a rise in welfare relative to the initial outcome.
2 This result follows from the following insight provided by Bergstrom and Varian (1985a, b) for a Cournot oligopoly composed of firms with constant marginal costs: Aggregate production costs will fall if the variance of marginal costs across firms is increased without altering the sum of marginal costs. Further, total industry output will not change implying that price and thus consumer surplus are also unchanged.
The paper provides a formal analysis of the potential benefit from asymmetric regulation in an environmental setting. Many problems of pollution can be analyzed within the basic two-stage game where a government in stage one imposes emission standards or taxes on an industry, thus affecting marginal costs in the ensuing Cournot game. Asymmetric regulation would then entail otherwise identical producers facing different levels of standards/taxes.
3
The set-up and assumptions we consider in this paper constitute the basic framework for numerous analyses of regulation of industry, both in the industrial organization and the environmental economics literatures. The scope for asymmetric regulation is our main concern here. 4 The environmental instrument invoked is a direct emission standard, the level of which directly determines firms' marginal abatement costs. As a preview, interpreting the asymmetry result in the context of pollution indicates that symmetric regulation may conflict with a minimization of total private production costs of industry (including costs of emission abatement). However, along the lines of Bergstrom-Varian, we first demonstrate that asymmetric treatment of equal firms, in terms of changes in marginal costs keeping a constant sum, will not necessarily be welfare improving, basically because such induced changes via environmental policy are likely to raise total emission from the industry. This suggests an interesting trade-off with respect to the effects on private and social costs of introducing asymmetry in environmental regulation. We subsequently find that, for a given marginal cost sum, asymmetric regulation will lead to welfare improvements when total welfare is convex along the path of constant aggregate marginal costs. Based on these insights, we leave the aggregate marginal costs focus to examine a perhaps more obvious question for an environmental authority: Is there
